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TUESDAY

JULY 7, 1953

Joe Harsch of the Christian Science Monitor came to see me this morning. He has been travelling extensively in Europe and reports a growing feeling that the EDC will never be ratified. I told him I still held the opinion that if Adenauer were reelected means would be found to bring about its ratification.

Jean Monnet arrived this morning following our telephone conversation of yesterday. He is ~~was~~ disturbed over the report that Massigli told Salisbury in London that, due to the Russian peace offensive, the French Government had altered its views concerning a German military contribution. This is in the field of rumor and the allegation may be highly inaccurate but it is another indication that the position of the French Government, and especially of the Quai d'Orsay, is unclear as to the course it will follow toward European integration measures.

As a result Monnet is sending a letter to George Murnane as follows:

"Since our last talk in New York I have been giving considerable thought to the present situation. Following my old habit I would like to organize my thoughts by putting them on paper and also get your personal comments on my analysis. Several things struck me on my return to Europe.

"1. In the first instance, propaganda has led many people in Europe to believe that the United States wishes in the present situation to inflict a defeat on Russia rather than to take advantage of present circumstances to create conditions for peace. They fear this attitude involves risks, now unknown, which might suddenly develop into war.

"2. In the second instance, the people of Europe are deeply conscious that we are entering a new phase. The post-war period has been dominated by a strong and threatening Russia. Germany was forgotten. Europe with the Marshall Plan aid was rebuilding her ruins and international action was necessarily limited by the immediate difficulties of reconstruction. Now, Germany is a fact; the nations of Europe have practically finished their reconstruction; and suddenly, after the death of Stalin, there is a ray of hope that Russia may no longer threaten the peace and that behind the Iron Curtain there are difficulties, perhaps immense difficulties.

"3. Not least, the coming of Eisenhower as President of the U. S. represented a hope for many people in Europe. He was a most popular man in Europe. They always accepted him as a general who wished to build

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

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DATE 7-1-81

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DECLASSIFIED

TUESDAY
JULY 7, 1953

-2-

strength, not for war but to improve our way of life. They followed his first declaration on European policy. But, since the new international situation developed, the people of Europe do not sense a leadership coming from the United States. That is why a great part of public opinion turned for a moment towards the illusory proposals of Mr. Churchill.

"4. I am struck by the fact that the people in Europe are not discussing whether we should meet with Soviet Russia. They are discussing whether we should abandon our policy to take advantage of new 'facts' in the international scene, whether our European and German policies still meet the requirements of the times.

"5. It is apparent that opponents of the European policy have seized upon these doubts and uncertainties to defeat or divert the constant progress towards fulfillment of our objectives. It is suggested that we now have the alternative of a united, neutralized Germany controlled by agreement with Russia; that ratification of the European Defense Community will provoke Russia and prevent peace; that the integration of Western Germany into a united Europe will prevent a united Germany; and that European integration is no longer possible with the risk of domination by a powerful, united Germany. These arguments have led to a feeling that we are turning away from our policies. In fact they have had some success in disorienting public opinion in Europe; in postponing ratification of the EDC Treaty; in encouraging inaction by the governments on the proposed political authority. If the conference in Washington is permitted to lead to a new speculation that the basis of Western policy is being reexamined, these doubts will increase.

"6. Moreover, the suggestion that our policy has been a temporary expedient entails an immediate risk for all of us in the coming German elections. The developing major issue there, sadly, is not a choice between socialist or more conservative leaders and policies; the issue is whether the future leaders of Germany can succeed by appealing to the desire for friendship with France and for equal and peaceful participation in a united Europe or whether to gain power they must appeal to motives of nationalism, hate, and aggrandizement at the expense of Germany's neighbors. The recent Socialist-led attack in the Bundestag against France undoubtedly fanned old flames of French-German enmity in both countries; but it also, in all Europe, gave pause to reflect on where failure to eliminate this evil antagonism could lead us.

"In a confused, uncertain situation such as I have described, optimism will give way to pessimism. But the reality, in fact, is quite different. We have reason for optimism.

"I have no doubt that the large majority of Germans are in favor of integration in the west as the only way of preserving their own liberty. This includes, according to my information, Germans from the East zone. The Germans know themselves that the recreation of a national Germany would mean the resurrection of the national forces which in Germany traditionally have led to some sort of totalitarian regime and to conflict and eventually war with her neighbors. Our risk in Germany is that we will

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

TUESDAY
JULY 7, 1953

-3-

defeat Adenauer by our own inaction; by enabling the opposition to use doubts of our own intentions to argue that his policies can and will be abandoned. In France it is an error to say, as some do, that the European army and the Political Authority cannot be voted. There is no doubt in my mind that there will be a parliamentary majority when the treaties are presented. Evidence is that the Socialist party in France has just faced this very issue and a large majority has voted in favor of continuing firmly our present policies. They did so despite the difficulties their action presents for the Socialists in Germany by helping Adenauer. The leaders of the MRP in the past two days also concluded strongly in favor of definite and continued support of the European policy. Moreover, with Reynaud, Teitgen, Mutter, Pleven, all leaders in the European movement. and the policy of French-German rapprochement, the new French Government when it has had time to thrash out its international policy offers considerable hope for firmer French leadership. De Gasperi says he has the votes for EDC and will push for rapid action on the Political Community as soon as his internal political affairs are arranged; the Benelux countries, in spite of the electoral difficulties in Belgium, will undoubtedly move with the others. The basic situation in Europe thus remains favorable.

"Now, in these circumstances, what is required is leadership and action. If the European and German policies are allowed to be the subject of constant discussions and hypothetical questions, then the situation will necessarily deteriorate; the forces that in fact will make our policies succeed will find themselves engulfed by general pessimism.

"The discussions that are going to take place in Washington in a few days are most important. From them should emerge a redefinition of our policies in the present international scene; a firm statement of American leadership and support; a concrete reaffirmation of the French position that some French leaders have allowed to be brought into question; and finally a new affirmation of the support by Great Britain of the European policy.

"This should be done, in my opinion, in terms that are understandable to all people who may happen to read them, whether they are in Texas, in France, in Germany, in England, or in Russia. The definition must respond to the aspirations of peace and liberty everywhere. The definition might include reference to the following points:

"1. Anybody in the world will accept it as natural for the President of the United States to say that the United States supports European integration because Americans desire to eliminate the causes that twice have forced their troops to fight in Europe. These wars brought disaster to all peoples, including the Russian; the least that can be asked of the Europeans is to eliminate the internal discussions which caused them.

"2. The American people have for the last seven years proved to the world that they wanted to help strengthen Europe for peace and prosperity. Certainly Europe does not wish aid to continue, and the American Government does not wish Europe to continue in that posture. The only way by which

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

TUESDAY
JULY 7, 1953

-4-

Europe can develop its production, that she can become 'self-supporting', is by continuing the policy of integration.

"3. The US-UK-French policy for the integration of Europe should be stated as an essential condition for the establishment of peace. It should also be explained that it was not a consequence of the cold war. European unity is the answer to Europe's own basic problems.

"4. It should be explained that in the world of today the Europeans, including those of German origin, must insure their defense in common. The size of this common army will be brought within the policy of the Three Powers to seek a general and controlled reduction of armaments. The peaceful purpose of this community should be further emphasized by explaining that the common army will be brought under a European political authority based on a common Parliament elected by popular suffrage.

"5. It should be made clear that European integration is intended to include a united Germany as soon as the Soviets make it possible to put an end to the present division of Germany. European unity and German unification are not contradictory but complementary. The inclusion of all Germans on the basis of equality, freedom and democracy in a larger united Europe will provide a guarantee for all, including Russia, against the recurrence of the disasters of the past. It is important by peaceful means by wipe out the boundaries which today keep the East and West Germans apart, fosters an irredentism that can do no good to the Germans, to Europe, or to the world, and peace will best be served by the union of Western and Eastern Germans within the European Community."

I sent Foster the following letter: -

"I have never inflicted a personal letter on you before and I excuse myself now for what may be an unwarranted suggestion because of my deep concern from our national standpoint over the importance of your conversations in Washington with Salisbury and Bidault.

"I have known Salisbury well for many years and have the highest opinion of him. As to Bidault, I like him personally and do not share the rather prevalent belief that he is a man without principles. However, he is a complex individual, given to intrigue, confident of his ability to gain his ends by intricate maneuvers and one who, as John Randolph once said of Aaron Burr, "rows to his objective with muffled oars".

"I wonder if you might consider talking privately to Bidault with no one else present except possibly Salisbury along the following lines.

"The President and you are not supporting policies for European integration because you are enamoured of a theoretical idea. Twice in your generation the United States has had to send her armed forces to the Continent to participate in wars bred by nationalistic rivalries in Europe. You do not propose to have this happen a third time for the same reasons. Also, the United States has expended 30 odd billion dollars

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

TUESDAY
JULY 7, 1953

-5-

to assist Western Europe to recovery during the past decade. It is not politically practicable at home nor does it seem desired abroad that this kind of subvention should continue when the Europeans by their own efforts, if reasonably united, could make unnecessary a continuance of at least a major part of this drain on the American taxpayer.

"You think it is appropriate that we be apprised of the real intentions of the French Government regarding the policy of a United Europe. Postponement of action is always confronting us on the part of the French Government or the French Parliament. Today it is the necessity of awaiting German elections, tomorrow it may well be that we will be told nothing can be decided until the French Presidential election is over.

"What is it the French want? If they think the strategy of forward defense involving a German military contribution is sound and will be ineffective without such a contribution by Germany, how do they propose, after their long delays, to establish such a defense? Can Bidault assure you that the admission of Germany to NATO and the creation of a German national army would be approved by the French Parliament? If not, and preferably, can he assure you that his Government will press vigorously ahead for a showdown on EDC ratification and meanwhile accelerate action on the European Political Community treaty instead of postponing any real consideration of it? Is it true that his own Foreign Office is staffed with high officials who for the most part are almost openly antagonistic to the ideas of European unity?

"In short, what does Monsieur Bidault, as the spokesman for the French Government in foreign affairs, propose to do in the way of making a public commitment on European policy which is not hedged about by so many reservations that other countries are uncertain of its aims.

"The United States Government has an alternative. If the Europeans, and especially France, want a neutralized Germany or a Germany which is not allowed by our allies to make a military contribution, then the whole strategy of forward defense fails, for the Europeans with their national armies will not be strong enough to protect themselves. Under such circumstances, the United States feels perfectly capable of defending itself from hostile aggression within its own continental limits for a long time to come, and it has no intention of continuing indefinitely to contribute to a strategy which the Europeans themselves have failed to make reasonable or practicable.

"This decision is a momentous one for Europe and Bidault bears a heavy responsibility for it. You would like an unequivocal answer as to what he proposes to do and would like to have his commitment incorporated in your joint communiqué.

"Well, that is my two cents' worth. I have included no comment on the fact that European Unity is an even further guarantee of the peaceful intentions of the West, etc. I feel certain that, if possible, Bidault

DECLASSIFIED